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Revision and Immortality in Philosophical
Argumentation: Continuing Thoughts on the
Rhetorical Wedge
MARl LEE MIFSUD

University ofRichmond

Abstract: This essay explores Johnstone's
idea that "rhetoric is a wedge." In particular,
it explores the place of this idea in
Johnstone's philosophy of argument, the
need to confront this idea with argument,
and ways of confronting it with ad rem and
ad hominem arguments.

Resume: On explore I'idee du Johnstone
selon laquelle la rhetorique est une "coin".
En particulier, on examine I'importance de
cette idee dans sa philosophie de I'argument
et Ie besoin d'opposer cette idee aux arguments ad rem et ad hominem.

Keywords: Henry Johnstone, rhetoric, argument, the rhetorical wedge, the rhetorical
bridge, ad rem, ad hominem, self-referential inconsistency.

I write this essay in tribute to Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., my mentor and friend.
Before Johnstone died we had a final conversation about writing. He remarked to
me that he had tried to write as he had tried to live, freely and with the kind of
passion, surprise, and wonder that can come only from an unprogrammatic approach void of obstacles or plans, with the exception of interesting questions
arising from perplexing problems. I write this tribute to Henry Johnstone with
these remarks in mind. I begin with the question that Johnstone asked me toward
the end of his life, namely how can one attack the thesis "rhetoric is a wedge"?
This question has a certain shock value when we consider that the idea of the
rhetorical wedge is one of the most pivotal in Johnstone's philosophy of argument.
The rhetorical wedge, as Johnstone came to frame its function, is a means, perhaps the only means, of evoking and maintaining the consciousness necessary for
communication (Johnstone, 1970, pp. 115-121). The very function of rhetoric is
to call attention to a situation for which objectivity is claimed. Rhetoric's solicitation
of attention is wholly different from a stimulus that directly excites a reflex, never
emerging as an object of consciousness. Such a stimulus is irrelevant to rhetorical
transactions (Johnstone, 1990, p. 334). All rhetorical transactions open up a space
of consciousness between an audience and some fact or idea of which it has been
hitherto unconscious. Johnstone uses the rhetorical wedge metaphor for whatever
act of speech that is capable of separating a subject from an object in such a way
that the former becomes conscious of the latter. These acts of speech can be as
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mundane as someone asking, "Isn't that your telephone ringing?" or as extraordinary as someone asking "Will we always be able to bear the financial cost of
applying the results of ongoing medical research to the project of extending our
lives further and further?" Upon hearing this question, one may for the first time
become aware of having hitherto unthinkingly assumed the cost to be continually
bearable.
When rhetoric acts like a wedge, it functions to evoke consciousness by separating a person addressed from some of her stimuli:
Wedges separate. What has been separated must have at least two parts.
The two parts separated by the wedge of rhetoric are the hitherto unnoticed
items now brought into the focus of attention, and the self that does the
attending. One cannot evoke an object of attention without evoking a self.
(Johnstone, 1980, p. 68.)

In the absence of the rhetorical wedge, no medium can be opened between consciousness and its object. Johnstone found Aristotle's message to Democritus
important for articulating this position, namely that in the absence of a medium we
could see nothing at alI.I Sight presupposes a metaxu, or an "in-between," what
Johnstone sometimes called an interface. We could not, for example, see an object
placed directly on the eye. Language, the medium of communication, must likewise separate the message from its recipient. Otherwise the activity would be akin
to opening a person's skull and simply placing the information on her brain. Computer communication works this way, but in human communication, information
does not pass directly from its source to the storage facilities of the receiver. The
gap that interrupts this direct passage is created by the interface of the rhetorical
wedge. The rhetorical wedge is what creates open-mindedness through the coming of contradiction. On the one hand, persons experiencing the rhetorical wedge
wish to maintain themselves. On the other hand, their exposure to something that
appears to bring their position into contradiction necessitates their risking change.
The tension between the desire to maintain themselves and the risk of change is
brought into being by means of the rhetorical wedge. "Such tension is necessary
to any human being who wishes to transcend the horizons of immediate experience and inhabit a world" (Johnstone, 1965, p. 4).
Considering the importance of the position that "rhetoric is a wedge" has in
Johnstone's theory of argument, before obliging him in pursuit of the question of
how we should attack it perhaps we should begin by asking why we should. We
might justify the inquiry on the surface by attending to the fact that Henry Johnstone,
the dying author of the idea, wanted to keep the conversation going. But framing
the "why" in this way is problematic. If Johnstone had wanted the conversation
on "rhetoric as a wedge" to continue, why would he have been motivated to attack
it? Why not advocate the motto to identify his philosophical legacy?
Although much of this essay will be devoted to pursuing this question, we can
begin for now by exploring the possibility of polemic in argumentation. Polemical
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confrontation forces a person to either revise or abandon her position. Both revision and abandonment are ways of elaborating and continuing the life of inquiryrevision does so by allowing the position to become more nuanced and complex;
abandonment does so by its committing inquiry to the quest for a more satisfactory substitute (Johnstone, 1978, p. 38). The mortality of inquiry comes with the
stiffening of a position. Positions stiffen when they are not kept flexible by arguments voiced effectively against them. Such flexibility can be recognized as an
age-old office of rhetoric whose duties are to move and to bend (flectere). To
prevent such stiffening of "the rhetorical wedge," to make it flexible, hence to
allow it to move and live on, we need to confront it with argument.
Perhaps the best way to start would be to review the work Johnstone and I did
prior to his death. We had noted only that rhetoric and the wedge do not often
coincide (Johnstone and Mifsud, 1999). Many wedges are not rhetorical, and
more important to our concerns at the time, not all rhetoric is wedge-like. Examples of both such failures of coincidence abound. Commands and threats are uses
of the wedge to produce non-rhetorical results; they reveal the failure of wedge
and rhetoric to occupy the same relative position. While threats and commands
can perhaps be thought of as exemplifying rhetoric, albeit of a "degenerate" sortone can hardly look down the barrel of a pistol without becoming fully consciousthere is no obvious way in which they are degenerate uses of the wedge in any
useful sense of 'degenerate.' The threatener and the issuer of commands ignore
bilaterality, a concept central to Johnstone's idea of the rhetorical wedge. Johnstone
marks off the orthodox version of rhetoric from the degenerate version by observing that what is ordinarily recognized as rhetoric is bilateral. A threat, on the other
hand, is unilateral; a gunman, for example, drives a wedge into the experience of
his victim, but not vice-versa. The gunman objectifies his victim as a means to
fulfilling his wishes, but whatever is objectified to this extent is likely to lose its
objectivity and recede into the background of unnoticed stimuli. A victim so
objectified cannot force himself upon the attention of the gunman (Johnstone,
1990, p. 335). That the gunman's performance suppresses all efforts of his victims to cope with him in reciprocative terms is a requirement fundamental to the
success of his performance. To put the matter another way, the person successfully addressed by a threat or command is unable to respond freely. Neither are
natural wedges, as opposed to symbolic wedges, generally considered rhetorical
acts. Besides reacting by unplugging one's computer, how can one respond in
kind to a lightening bolt? Wedges fall short of full rhetoricality when they do not
maintain throughout the possibility of bilateral exchange.
Not only do the wedge and rhetoric fail to overlap because not all wedges are
rhetorical, but because not all rhetoric is wedge-like. Such wedgeless rhetoric is
generally characterized by a speaker's intention to bypass audience consciousness
to the greatest degree possible. The most effective bypassing of audience consciousness would be subliminal persuasion, but the rhetoric of pep rallies and
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partisan political gatherings is more likely that which one thinks about when considering rhetoric that does not drive a wedge At no point during a pep rally, for
example, does the speaker wish his audience to ask, "Is it the case that our team
really will, or better yet should, win the game tomorrow?" Rather, such performances bridge both the speaker and audience with the shared idea of the worthiness
of a position. This bridge is an act of identification which precludes the possibility
of alternative perspectives being brought to consciousness. Rather than bringing
to light new consciousness, rhetoric that bridges in this way may be thought of as
manipulating a consciousness already existing in an audience. This rhetoric is not
precipitated by calling to the attention of the participants anything the truth of
which they are not already persuaded of. Although some might regard this rhetoric
to be part of what has traditionally been known as epideictic (rhetoric that displays
that which is praiseworthy and blameworthy within a culture), we do not have to
regard the function of epideictic as degenerate. We could point out, for example,
that epideictic rhetoric attempts to bridge a person to a virtuous other, to teach
public excellence by identifying an audience with public models of virtue. As a
bridge, epideictic connects an audience's consciousness of virtuosity with a model
of public virtue (Johnstone and Mifsud, 1999, p. 76).
Johnstone and I also looked to the common rhetorical techniques in addition to
the genres of rhetoric for operations of the rhetorical bridge. We recognized that
amplification, a favored and frequently used rhetorical technique, takes as its subject the undisputed. It draws from a common pool of readily available and agreed
upon beliefs, values, and understandings. As Aristotle describes, when a particular
consciousness is in an audience already, all that remains to be done by the rhetor is
to attribute to it greater beauty and importance, in other words to celebrate this
consciousness. We note that while this celebration is not a wedge, because it calls
attention to nothing the audience did not already believe, it is a bridge. It is an
appeal to the identification of "like" consciousness (Johnstone and Mifsud, 1999,
p.76).
If arguments were to be made against "rhetoric is a wedge" that stemmed
from such considerations as these, namely of the failure of rhetoric and wedge to
coincide, it would be easy to defend the position. For example, we could point out
that "rhetoric is a wedge" refers to a particular moment in a larger rhetorical
process, a tri-partite process that begins with the evocation of consciousness and
ends in decision after having proceeded through deliberation. The earlier part of
the process, namely the evocation of consciousness of a particular problem, can
be governed by the metaphor "rhetorical wedge" and the latter part of the process,
namely the arrival of a decision, can be governed by the metaphor "rhetorical
bridge." This would be the case whether we are speaking of the more traditional
Aristotelian referent of public address, or whether we are speaking of a performance of identification beyond this, such as the reflexive rhetoric of personal deliberation. As Johnstone and I have noted, if rhetoric only wedges, when an indi-
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vidual is tom asunder by the recognition of a particular problem, the sundering will
collapse into schizophrenia. The end of reflexive rhetoric would be to bridge the
sundered mind, allowing for a unity manifest in a personal decision. Considering
the possibilities of a response such as this, we might rest on the position that while
"rhetoric is a wedge" may not need to be abandoned, it needs to be supplemented
with "rhetoric is a bridge" (Johnstone and Mifsud, 1999, p. 77).
But should we rest here? Is supplementation of a position the same as revision?
If by revision we mean that which one must pursue when he recognizes an inconsistency between his propositions and their formulation, and ifby supplementation
we mean something in addition to the position in question, then supplementation is
not the same as revision. A supplement in this regard is an addition to, not a
confrontation of Such a supplement does not puncture "rhetoric is a wedge"; it
leaves the proposition about rhetoric's function to distinguish and the formulation
ofthis proposition intact and merely adds some new proposition about rhetoric's
function to identify and the formulation of this proposition, namely "rhetoric is a
bridge." But positing a "supplement" is not only insufficient for creating a genuine
contact of minds, it is irrelevant to the enterprise. No contact is made between the
advocate of rhetoric's function to identify and the advocate of rhetoric's function
to distinguish. The two remain distinct without ever having to take each other
seriously.
Ifwe privilege the genuine confrontation of a position with difference, a confrontation that will force either revision or abandonment so that the inquiry can be
elaborated by a genuine contact of minds, we will reject using such tactics for
attacking and defending "rhetoric is a wedge." These tactics are cheap because
they approach the question ad rem. Argumentum ad rem points to a world beyond
that which is presented by the position in question, and in doing so fails to confront the position on its own terms. To attack the viability of "rhetoric is a wedge"
by pointing out to the holder of that position that he has not accounted for the fact
that "rhetoric is a bridge" begs the question. The attempt to call a person's attention to what his own principles prevent him from attending to is a petitio principii,
akin for example to confronting a blind man with a stop sign (Johnstone, 1987, p.
132). Arguing ad rem fails because a person's attention cannot be called to something that he is incapable of attending to by virtue of his own commitments. Each
person attends to the world as characterized by whatever feature or features they
regard as fundamental. This is easy to see in the world of ideas. Just as Parmenides
never seems to notice change in the world, B.F. Skinner never seems to notice
behavior not resulting from conditioning (Johnstone, 1987, p. 131). Argumentation as an activity of various advocates attending to various features but inattentive
to others creates an impasse or stand-off where differences can only be pointed
out and explained. We would likely not call this argumentation, but rather exposition. Opposing positions cannot be pointed out simply to a person because her
own position renders her incapable of recognizing this opposition as a problem, or
possibly even as a phenomenon.
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If ad rem arguments are unavailable to us, how then do we confront a position
with difference? We can begin to pursue this question with what Johnstone considered a general desideratum in formulating an argument, namely to approach
argument self-referentially, in other words to attempt to confront a position by
showing that on its own principles it is inconsistent. The significance of asserting
that a position ought to be argued self-referentially is to imply that its validity
depends on no reference to a fact or situation external to it (Johnstone, 1978, p.
II). Much of Johnstone's writing on argumentation set out to show not only that
self-referential refutation exemplifies a valid use of argumentum ad hominem, but
also that many other types of argumentation belong to the same category of ad
hominem.
The ad hominem, as Johnstone treats it, can be approached most succinctly by
way of contrast to ad rem argument. Johnstone draws from Richard Whately's
treatment of ad hominem to distinguish it from argumentum ad rem. Whately states,
"The conclusion which actually is established, is not the absolute and general one
in question, but relative and particular; viz., not that 'such and such is the fact,'
but that 'this man is bound to admit it, in conformity to his principles of reasoning,
or consistency with his own conduct, situation,' &c." (Whately, 1838, p. 196).
Argumentum ad rem exhibits those properties which, according to Whately,
argumentum ad hominem does not. Thus argumentum ad rem claims to establish
an absolute and general conclusion of the form "such and such is the fact." Its
cogency does not depend on its audience in the way that the cogency of ad hominem must.
Ad rem arguments do not establish their conclusions based upon the principles
of those to whom they are addressed, but ad hominem arguments must be established from the principles of those to whom they are addressed. Ad hominem
arguments in this way. engage the reasoning and adapt to the assumptions of the
interlocutor. The motive is to reveal a contradiction in the interlocutor's position,
and force an interlocutor to confront the commitments and consequences of her
position. Such a revelation can only be witnessed from the perspective of the self,
hence the ad hominem argument is evocative of self-awareness and the need to
reflect responsibly on one's own position.
Such argument will presuppose that the interlocutors see the point of a position. However, one cannot see the point of a position until she grasps the motivation underlying the position. A problem arises now with the recognition of the
insufficiency of describing the motives from which a philosophical position is
taken, since such motives will themselves seem arbitrary. Suppose we are told that
the rhetorical wedge stems from a concern with distinction, and the rhetorical
bridge from a concern with identification. One might be tempted to ask what the
point is of such concerns. Answering this question requires becoming involved in
the differences between the rhetorical wedge and bridge, instead of being content
merely to describe these differences. Being involved in the differences, we shall
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have to be polemical instead of expository. Being polemical as such means we do
not side-step the issues of an argument, but meet them and each other head-on.
Such polemical argumentation is evocative. It evokes consciousness by addressing another where he lives, not by hitting him over the head with facts (Johnstone,
1978, p. 137). What I have been introducing in this essay thus far as the contrast
between ineffective argument about "rhetoric is a wedge" and the possibility of
relatively effective argument is brought into perspective now through the difference between the use of argumentum ad rem and the use of argumentum ad hominem. Relatively effective argument against "rhetoric is a wedge" is going to be ad
hominem.
Before proceeding, we need to return to the beginning, to the inquiry about
why one would want to attack "rhetoric is a wedge". The contrast between ad rem
and ad hominem arguments forces us to question whether the activity I have been
engaging in thus far with "rhetoric is a wedge" is more like a game or a clever
pursuit of the last wishes of a dying man and less a genuinely motivated argument.
Genuine motivation would have to come from the recognition that a thesis needs
to be confronted because of its inconsistency, in other words the inconsistency
between its propositions and its formulation. Such an inconsistency would threaten
to destroy the very principles a position is trying to establish. The only genuine
reason to attack "rhetoric is a wedge" is if the formulation of this position demonstrates such an inconsistency. And indeed the slogan "rhetoric is a wedge" does
demonstrate such an inconsistency. The slogan, while proposing "rhetoric is a
wedge," is itself actually rhetoric functioning to bridge, functioning to create identification with and adherence to the formulation of the position. Hence, the very
advocacy of "rhetoric is a wedge" threatens to destroy it. The stronger the advocacy of "rhetoric is a wedge," the stronger the motive to drive the wedge of
"rhetoric is a wedge." Such strengthening of the activity, however, overwhelms
the situation, and leads the advocate into self-referential inconsistency. The activity of the advocate of "rhetoric is a wedge" becomes unilateral. This exhibition of
unilaterality shows the advocacy of "rhetoric is a wedge" to be inconsistent with
the commitments that one who holds the position must make, namely those commitments to bilaterality presupposed by the rhetorical wedge. Therein lies a genuine motivation for argument about "rhetoric is a wedge."
We might find that going to the idea that rhetoric is an interface might offer
some specifics on revision. An interface is both a wedge and a bridge. It is a
genuine gulf between the communication of information through language to an
understanding subject. The peculiarity of this gulfis that it can be crossed. But the
specifics of revision lie beyond the scope of this present essay.
Before closing, I want to qualify that I am not suggesting that Johnstone's
philosophy of argument advocated, as a means of positing, the position "rhetoric
is a wedge." Johnstone was quite careful not to do this. He tells us as much in the
opening of one of his most explicit treatments of the rhetorical wedge (Johnstone,
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1990, p. 333). He notes that prior to the time that George Yoos referred to "rhetoric as a wedge" as part of Johnstone's theory of argument, Johnstone himself had
only incidentally and in passing used the phrase. 2 He also notes that most indexers
of the books in which he had used the phrase had missed it altogether. I wish to
suggest only that advocacy is a possible consequence of the rhetorical wedge
taking hold in certain circles, say for example, in scholarly circles that might find
the idea worth advocating as a critical perspective on discourse, or in pedagogical
circles where teachers of rhetoric and argument might advocate the idea to their
students as an ethical framework for their practice.
Second, I do not want to suggest that what I call an inconsistency, anyone
holding the position that "rhetoric is a wedge" will necessarily admit to be an
inconsistency. The question arises then whether such an argument can really overcome the solipsistic impasse that seemed to preclude genuine argument about
"rhetoric is a wedge." This question requires much more attention than this essay
can provide, including full attention to the Consistency Problem and the way in
which this problem brings to light the need to reject notions of objective validity
and to adopt notions of validity as a regulative ideal (Johnstone, 1978, p. 135).
For now, however, we can be assisted by Johnstone's general framing of the
situation: Suppose an advocate of A produces a presupposition involved in B that
is, in his opinion, inconsistent with the formulation of B. What reason is there to
suppose any advocate of B must agree that there is an inconsistency? If he need
not agree, the impasse remains. Of course, the attacker may be mistaken. Perhaps
what the attacker takes to be an inconsistency between the formulation of Band
the presuppositions of B is not really an inconsistency. The question Johnstone
raises however is just whether such an attacker must always be mistaken. Is it
possible for an inconsistency to develop within a position that has reason on its
side? If it is possible, that will be sufficient to overcome the impasse (Johnstone,
1978, p. 50). Inconsistency is not a matter offact but a matter of probability. I am
only prepared to frame the matter this way: if such inconsistency were to be
accepted as inconsistency, it would necessitate that "rhetoric is a wedge" be revised or abandoned on account of this inconsistency. However, abandonment seems
an un likely outcome because the ad hominem argument calling attention to such an
inconsistency is itself a rhetorical wedge opening up the advocate of the position
that "rhetoric is a wedge" to the need to attend to his own position.

Notes
IThis reference can be found in De Anima 419a 17.
2yoos's paper, "Rhetoric of Appeal and Rhetoric of Response." was presented at a session of
The International Society for the History of Rhetoric in Chicago in November, 1986. It was
later published in Philosophy and Rhetoric 20 (1987): J07- J J7.
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